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PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
THE NEED FOR HEIGHTENED REPORTING AND A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION IN THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT
Nika A. Antonikova

I. INTRODUCTION
The World Bank estimates that bribery, one form of corruption, costs
the world’s economies about one trillion dollars annually. 1 Even beyond
this tremendous figure lie costs related to theft and embezzlement, lost
investments, and corruption between private companies. 2 Corruption is
an elusive term that is difficult to define because it has numerous
manifestations and cultural nuances.3 For the purposes of this Comment,
corruption is defined as the “abuse or misuse of a position of trust or
responsibility for private gain rather than for the purpose for which that
trust or responsibility is conferred.” 4
For years, corruption in the private sector was overlooked or
downplayed by scholars and the public because it was assumed that
corruption in the public sector was more damaging to the public interest
and, therefore, constituted a more serious offense. 5 As a result, even
though the idea of regulating commercial bribery has been around since
at least 1922, it has yet to translate into effective legislation. 6 Today,
however, new quantitative and qualitative research illuminates the high
costs of private sector corruption 7 and suggests that the problem is
almost as pervasive as corruption in the public sector.8
1
See, e.g., Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global
Governance
Director
Daniel
Kaufmann,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(2013),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457
~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
2
Id.
3
Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM. BUS. L.J.
325, 329–30 (2012).
4
This definition is one of the most general. E.g., id. at 330; Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and
Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967).
5
W. PAATII OFOSU-AMAAH, RAJ SOOPRAMANIEN & KISHOR UPRETY, COMBATING
CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICE AND
MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVES
66
(1999),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/10/07/000094946_9909211
0080687/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. See also Antonio Argandoña, Private-to-Private
Corruption, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003).
6
Note, Bribery in Commercial Relationships, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (1932).
7
See, e.g., Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 670, 672–76 (2008) (discussing the harms of private sector corruption at firm, industry,
national, and systems levels).
8
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX REPORT 3, 19 (2011), available at
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/results. Private sector corruption can be manifested by offering
clients gifts and corporate hospitality, demanding bribes or kickbacks from potential suppliers, as
well as paying bribes to secure beneficial contracts. Id. In fact, corruption in the private sector
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Due to recent trends in the international marketplace, the potential
harm of corruption has grown to the point that it can no longer be
ignored. With the removal of many trade barriers between nations in
recent years, companies face intense competition in emerging markets,
which, in turn, has led to a proliferation of corrupt practices. 9 Other
trends affecting corruption are the privatization of many publicly owned
companies and the resulting blurring of the distinction between private
corruption and the more effectively punished public sector corruption. 10
With ever-growing volumes of international trade, federal legislation
prohibiting private sector corruption has become a necessity.
This Comment will first examine current federal legislation and its
shortcomings, then offer a blueprint for preventing some of the costs
associated with private sector corruption by encouraging the United
States to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in two ways:
1) adding a private right of action for victims of private sector corruption
to recover damages, and 2) stepping up regulation of private corruption
through heightened accounting and reporting requirements.
Section II of this Comment examines existing regulations of private
sector corruption in the U.S., including the FCPA, 11 and discusses why
they are currently inadequate. Section III discusses various international
agreements on combating corruption and their implications for U.S.
companies involved in international trade. Finally, Section IV of this
Comment considers different options and explains why amending the
FCPA to extend its accounting and reporting provisions to private sector
corruption, together with providing victims of private sector corruption
with a private right of action to recover damages, is the most sensible
solution.
II. U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
THE NEED FOR REFORM
This Section will discuss existing anti-corruption regulations, both
state and federal. First, this Section explores the FCPA and its criticisms,
and it argues that these same criticisms should be considered in
addressing private sector corruption. Next, this Section explores the
inability of existing state and federal commercial bribery statutes to
effectively address the problem of corruption in the private sector of
international trade. Even the FCPA—the only statute that undoubtedly
has extra-territorial reach—does not currently cover corruption in the
private sector.
became more “visible” with the growth of international efforts to fight public sector corruption. See
Argandoña, supra note 5.
9
Argandoña, supra note 5, at 253–54.
10
Id. at 254. See also OFOSU-AMAAH, SOOPRAMANIEN & UPRETY, supra note 5, at 66.
11
The FCPA plays an important role in the analysis because it is thus far the only U.S. antibribery statute that has transnational reach, and the lessons learned from an examination of public
sector bribery regulations can potentially be translated into the private sector. See Nichols, supra
note 3, at 331.
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A. The FCPA: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges
This subsection discusses the inception of the FCPA, its two major
provisions and how they have been supplied, and its three major
criticisms and relevant responses.
1. History of Enactment
The FCPA is the child of a number of high-profile corruption
scandals, including the Watergate scandal 12 and the notorious Lockheed
case, where a company bribed foreign public officials in the Netherlands,
Japan, and Italy to obtain government contracts. 13 In 1975, Congress
faced a grim picture: about 400 companies, including 117 in the Fortune
Top-500, disclosed illegal or questionable payments to foreign officials
after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted a
voluntary disclosure program. 14 Many of these cases had entirely
domestic effects since companies had paid bribes to “outcompete” their
American peers rather than their foreign competitors. 15 Still, Congress
responded by proclaiming that bribing foreign public officials is “counter
to the moral expectations and values of the American public.” 16 In
addition to these economic dilemmas, 17 corporate bribery caused foreign
policy problems for the United States, jeopardizing its positions in the
Cold War with the Soviet Union.18 After lengthy congressional debates
on how to tackle corruption, President Carter signed the FCPA into law
in December 1977. 19
The FCPA was amended twice, in 1988 and 1998. 20 The 1988
amendment was mostly in response to complaints from businesses that
the FCPA was too vague. 21 The amendment established a standard of
12
Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion
Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442–43 (2010). Thomas points out that the
Nixon Administration engaged in illegal activities, including the creation of secret “slush funds”
used to fund illegal political campaign contributions and international bribery. Id. (quoting Lowell
Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 26 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241 (2001)).
13
Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International
Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 307 (2012).
14
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (2006).
15
Id. at 5.
16
Id. at 4 (quotations omitted).
17
Id. at 5. Members of Congress noted that bribery eroded public confidence in the free market
by placing contracts in the hands of inefficient companies that cannot compete without bribing. Id. at
4–5. It also led to costly lawsuits, cancellation of contracts, and other negative economic
consequences. Id.
18
Id. at 5. The Report states that corporate bribery “embarrass[es] friendly governments” and
“lower[s] the esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign nations.” Id.
19
See Klaw, supra note 13, at 308; Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007).
20
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1419-1425 (1988); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105366, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-3312 (1998).
21
See Krever, supra note 19, at 88–89.

95

WINTER 2015

Private Sector Corruption

“knowing” for conduct by third parties 22 and clarified the exception for
“facilitating” or “grease-the-wheels” payments. 23 The 1988 amendment
also introduced some affirmative defenses to corruption charges. 24 This
latter amendment extended the reach of the FCPA to “any person” over
which the U.S. Department of Justice had jurisdiction,25 as well as to any
violations of the law “while in the territory of the United States,”26 thus
making the law truly extra-territorial in nature.27
2. A Brief Overview of the FCPA
The FCPA has two major types of provisions: accounting 28 and antibribery. 29 Under its accounting provisions, all publicly-held companies
either registered or required to file reports with the SEC, including
companies that hold American Depository Receipts,30 are subject to the
FCPA’s record-keeping and internal control provisions. The FCPA
requires every issuer of securities to 31 “make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets.” 32 Seemingly innocuous, this
provision applies to a broad class of securities issuers, including those
not having any foreign operations. 33

22
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006) (defining “knowing” as a person's state of mind
when a person is aware or has a strong belief as to the circumstances or that a result is certain to
occur. Knowledge is also inferred when a person is aware of a high probability, unless a person
actually believes that the circumstance does not exist); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2006) (defining
the same); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3) (2006) (defining the same); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (Supp.
V 1981).
23
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(B) (2006); 15 U.S.C § 78dd-2(B) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(B) (2006)
(all three sections defining the same for different groups of affected entities); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1(B) (Supp. V 1981).
24
See Krever, supra note 19, at 89. Payments are exempt if they are legal under the laws of the
receiving official's country or if the payment is for “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure.” Id.
25
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 4,
112 Stat. 3302, 3306 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006)).
26
Id. §§ 2(d), 3(d) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (2006)). See Thomas, supra
note 12, at 448 (suggesting that even foreign nationals are potentially subject to prosecution).
27
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 54–55 (1998) (explaining that the 1998 amendments were
meant to extend the reach of the FCPA to the acts taken on behalf of U.S. businesses “by their
officers, directors, employees, agents or stockholders outside the territory of the United States,
regardless of the nationality of the officer, director employee, agent, or stockholder”).
28
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103, 14 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)).
29
Id.; Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 14 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd2, 78dd-3 (2006)).
30
Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – 1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 96 (2010). The FCPA also covers American Depository Receipts
holders. David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671, 675 (2009).
Depository Receipts are instruments issued by U.S. banks representing a specified amount of shares
of a foreign company that is traded on a U.S. exchange. Id. Thus, the FCPA potentially covers all the
foreign companies traded on any U.S.-based exchanges. Id.
31
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2006).
32
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).
33
ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 19 (2010).
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The FCPA uses a broad definition of “records” that includes
practically all “transcribed information of any type.” 34 “Reasonable
detail” is defined as satisfying “prudent officials in the conduct of their
own affairs.” 35 Thus, FCPA record-keeping provisions are broad in scope
and imply that even inaccurate records of non-material payments may be
criminally punishable.36 The FCPA also requires companies to establish
a system of controls to reasonably assure that transactions are properly
authorized. 37
Two acts have been introduced to increase the effectiveness of the
FCPA. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduces some notable
changes to the accounting provisions of the FCPA.38 This Act increases
penalties for violations of the FCPA’s reporting requirements. 39
Additionally, it requires securities issuers to report results of internal
control effectiveness assessments and to report any corrective measures
needed to remedy deficiencies and material weaknesses. 40
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 establishes a new whistleblower
program to encourage reporting of any Securities Exchange Act
violations, including the FCPA. 41 Under this program, whistleblowers
that provide “original information” about FCPA violations are protected
from retaliation and may even receive a monetary reward from the
amounts recovered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC in
enforcement actions. 42 Under another Dodd-Frank provision, the
“resource extraction issuers” are required to report any payments made to
foreign governments for the purpose of the commercial development of
oil, natural gas, or minerals. 43
In addition to these accounting provisions, the FCPA has several
anti-bribery provisions. These provisions constitute the “heart” of the
statute. The anti-bribery provisions are broader in reach than the
accounting provisions: they cover not only “issuers” of securities, but
also “domestic concerns” and “any person . . . while in the territory of
the United States.” 44 These provisions criminalize bribery of foreign
34

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (2006).
36
See Bixby, supra note 30, at 96; Dworsky, supra note 30, at 675.
37
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i). See also Dworsky, supra note 30, at 677 (listing factors the
SEC considers in determining the adequacy of the internal controls system: (i) the role of the board
of directors; (ii) communication of corporate procedures and policies; (iii) assignment of authority
and responsibility; (iv) competence and integrity of personnel; (v) accountability for performance
and compliance with policies and procedures; and (vi) objectivity and effectiveness of the internal
audit function).
38
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
39
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(2006)).
40
Id.; § 302(a)(6), 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(6) (2006)).
41
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 922-924, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-50 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78u-6, 78u-7 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
42
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-3 (2014).
43
15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D)-(2)(A) (2012).
44
15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(a) (“issuers”), 78dd-2(a) (“domestic concerns”), 78dd-3(a) (“any
person”) (1998). See also Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the Int'l Bribery Conventions,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 602-04 (2002) (discussing that actions under this section have in some
35
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officials in order to “influence any act,” induce any unlawful action, or
induce any action that would “assist . . . in obtaining or retaining
business” or “securing any improper advantage.” 45 Individuals or
businesses are prohibited from “directly or indirectly offering, paying,
promising, or authorizing to pay money or anything of any value to any
foreign official.” 46
Originally, prosecuting violations of these anti-bribery provisions
was difficult for two reasons. The first difficulty was, and continues to
be, the requirement of proving certain elements, including the intent to
corruptly influence any official act or decision.47 The second difficulty to
successful prosecution was the requirement of a territorial nexus between
the corrupt act and the United States. 48 Fortunately, the FCPA was
amended in 1998 to exclude the territorial nexus requirement, making the
use of interstate commerce no longer necessary for prosecution of
securities issuers and domestic concerns under the FCPA. 49
It is also important to note that the FCPA does not prohibit
“facilitating” or “grease” payments to foreign public officials for the
performance of routine governmental actions. 50 Of further note, the
FCPA outlines two affirmative defenses. 51 First, if offering a payment,
gift, or “anything of value” to a foreign official is within the written laws
of the host country, such payments do not fall within the scope of the
FCPA. 52 The second defense covers “reasonable and bona fide
expenditure[s]” made without a corrupt purpose.53
3. Ongoing Criticisms of the FCPA
The FCPA has been the target of criticism since its enactment in
1977. Three major criticisms are that the FCPA 1) leads to a competitive
instances reached foreign persons who were neither doing business in the U.S. nor were residents of
the U.S.).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)-3(a)(1998).
46
Dworsky, supra note 30, at 678.
47
Id. at 680–82 (providing the full list of elements). See also Bixby, supra note 30, at 94.
48
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (providing alternative bases for jurisdiction over issuers); § 78dd2(i) (providing alternative bases for jurisdiction over domestic concerns).
49
Dworsky, supra note 30, at 673.
50
Id. However, in Wabtec, the DOJ asserted that periodic payments to railroad officials to
speed up shipments ranging from $67 to $358 and totaling $2,175 per year violated the FCPA. NonProsecution Letter re Wabtec from Criminal Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, at 4 (Feb. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/westinghouse-corp/02-08-08wabtecagree.pdf.
51
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (1998); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-579, at
921-22 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing affirmative defenses included in the 1988 amendments to the
FPCA).
52
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1). The statute itself does not set a cap
on the maximum allowable amount. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 30, at 96. Bruce Klaw suggests
setting it at the level of five thousand dollars per official because most payments below this
threshold would fall under existing FCPA exceptions or defenses and would be too inconsequential
to satisfy the “obtaining or retaining business” element of the FCPA. See Klaw, supra note 13, at
351–52. However, in Wabtec, the company was prosecuted for payments as small as $67. See supra
note 50.
53
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2). See also Dworsky, supra note 30, at
684 (explaining when the defense is available).
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disadvantage for American corporations, 2) presents an example of moral
imperialism, and 3) is blind to the “demand” side of corruption. Because
the same reasoning may be used to criticize attempts to regulate private
sector corruption, addressing each of these criticisms is important in
designing a response to the problem of private sector corruption.
First, scholars and business leaders criticize the FCPA as being a
competitive disadvantage for U.S. corporations. For example, studies
conducted in the U.S in the 1980–90s show that the market share of U.S.
companies increased significantly in regions where bribery was
common, 54 as well as in some industries that were deemed susceptible to
bribery. 55 Additionally, defending against FCPA lawsuits has become a
major legal expense item for corporations, 56 leaving these corporations
with decreased resources. Further, some economic analysts claim that the
FCPA and its enforcement result in companies forgoing economic
opportunities out of the fear of prosecution.57
On the other hand, there is evidence that the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions may indeed be an advantage to some U.S. companies. 58 First,
scholars argue that the ability to give bribes can hardly be described as a
“competitive advantage” since such payments result in inefficiency both
on the macro 59 and micro economic levels; 60 thus, the FCPA guards
against these economic inefficiencies. Second, companies that give
bribes also show slower growth rates and lower productivity, experience
higher direct costs, and are more likely to have strained internal and
external relationships.61 Third, some U.S. companies report the FCPA’s

54

See Krever, supra note 19, at 90–91.
Id. (noting that in those industries more susceptible to corruption the growth rates were even
higher than in other industries).
56
See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL STREET JOURNAL BLOG (Oct.
2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352.html
(reporting that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Avon Products, Inc., and Weatherford International Inc. spent
$456 million on internal investigation of corruption before even being charged, and that most of the
money went to law firms and other specialists hired to conduct investigations and improve internal
control systems).
57
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-91-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
ON
U.S.
BUSINESS,
14
(1981),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf. See also U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 6 (2010), available at http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf (stating
that “up to $1 billion” in “lost U.S. export trade” results from the FCPA every year).
58
See Nichols, supra note 3 (citing research on the effects of corruption and highlighting its
devastating effects at the company level). But see Krever, supra note 19, at 90–92 (citing studies
showing that the FCPA did not have such a detrimental economic effect on businesses).
59
See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 25–26 (1999). Rose-Ackerman was one of the first scholars who
discussed detrimental effects of corruption on the overall government legitimacy and how it deters
direct foreign investment. See also Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 861,
869–70 (2010) (arguing that bribery destroys “rational markets” because contracts go into the hands
of those willing to pay bribes, without regard to such traditional rational market factors as price and
quality).
60
See Nichols, supra note 3, at 328.
61
Id. at 335 (direct costs), 338 (lower growth rates), 340 (lower productivity), 341 (internal
relationships), 344 (external relationships).
55
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prohibitions on giving bribes as helping them avoid unnecessary
expenses. 62
Moreover, U.S. companies that do not engage in corruption may not
be at a disadvantage to companies that do; economic analysts claim that
FCPA enforcement reaches beyond U.S. borders and results in
“economic sanctions” in the form of “a reduction in investments” for
corporations in developing countries with widespread corruption. 63
Additionally, the 1977 House Report notes that paying bribes could be
unnecessary, as many U.S. companies have successful export programs
without engaging in corruption. 64
The second criticism of the FCPA is that it constitutes moral
imperialism. Scholars emphasize that the definition of corruption can be
dependent on “cultural and linguistic gaps”: what some cultures consider
hospitality, others outlaw as corruption. 65 Imposing an American
definition of corruption on other nations is, in some cases, incompatible
with their practices. 66 Moreover, such cultural imposition might cause
parties to forgo economically efficient transactions because they violate
U.S. moral standards (as incorporated in the FCPA). 67
In response, other scholars argue that the FCPA demonstrates a
certain degree of cultural sensitivity by facilitating payment provisions
and allowing affirmative defenses to allegations of corruption.68 Indeed,
the 1977 House Report explains that while some payments “may be
reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they are
not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such
payments.” 69
The third and final criticism of the FCPA is that it focuses on the
supply side of corruption, leaving foreign public officials who take or
solicit bribes out of its reach. 70 In other words, the FCPA fails to
accomplish the global trend of attempting to punish both supply and
demand sides of corruption. 71 Scholars argue that it would be reasonable
for American legislators to consider enacting similar provisions both to

62
Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disadvantage, But
For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 309 (1994) (referencing how the FCPA helped
Colgate-Palmolive to avoid questionable payments while negotiating a joint venture in China).
63
Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as
Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 366 (2010).
64
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977).
65
Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 429 (1999).
66
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 276–78 (1997).
67
Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 583, 608 (2006).
68
Spalding, supra note 63, at 365.
69
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
70
See generally Spalding, supra note 63, at 358–64.
71
See Part III of this Comment.
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address problems within the U.S. and to contribute to global efforts to
eradicate corruption on both sides 72
B. Regulation of Private Sector Corruption in the United States
The United States has long considered punishing private sector
corruption. 73 Domestically, there are many legal theories one can use to
sue a company that obtains business by means of bribery. However,
while many states have extensive commercial bribery regulations, many
of these statutes lack the extra-territorial reach of the FCPA and do not
cover foreign corruption. This causes state laws to be inadequate in that
they condemn commercial bribery domestically, but do nothing about
bribery in the context of international trade. 74 This subsection first
explores state remedies for private sector corruption and then covers the
following federal statutory remedies: the Robinson-Patman Act, the Wire
and Mail Fraud Statute, and the Travel Act. 75
1. State Remedies and Challenges Regarding Private Sector Corruption
Many states offer a variety of legal avenues to pursue claims of
private sector corruption, such as unfair competition laws, tortious
interference with prospective business relations laws, and—most
importantly—criminal laws prohibiting commercial bribery. 76 Yet, even
at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, scholars and legislators
realized that state-to-state differences in such regulations posed a great
problem in prosecuting commercial bribery across state lines. 77 If
prosecuting across state lines proves to be a challenge, it is easy to see
the difficulty in prosecuting corruption based in another country.
72

See Klaw, supra note 13, at 320–24, 334–36, 361–68. Klaw argues that punishing only bribe
payers is inequitable because, under the current provisions, corrupt public officials who solicit or
accept illegal payments go free. He claims that neither jurisdictional basis nor immunity of said
officials would pose an obstacle to prosecution if the host country were unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
73
Bribery, supra note 6, at 1248–51 (1932). The appearance of an editorial on the subject of
commercial bribery in Harvard Law Review indicates the scholarly and societal debate of the issue.
74
A recent Supreme Court decision in Kiobel raises additional concerns by introducing the
“touch and concern test” to displace a general presumption against extra-territoriality of U.S. laws.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). Essentially, the majority opinion
precludes any litigation against U.S. corporations committing torts abroad in the U.S. courts because
it focuses on where the conduct has occurred, not citizenship of a corporate defendant. See Kedar S.
Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 447, 474–77 (2013). Because commercial bribery is likely classified as a tort or a
crime in other foreign jurisdictions, U.S. corporations are likely protected from any tort claims if the
bribing occurred outside the U.S. under Kiobel’s arduous “touch and concern” test. In countries that
do not recognize commercial bribery as a tort or a crime, plaintiffs will be without any legal means
to recover the damages suffered. Thus, only the adoption of an FCPA-like statute, where Congress
states clearly that it is extra-territorial in nature, would be a solution for the problem of private sector
corruption in international trade.
75
Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §13a, 13b, 21a (1936); Mail and Wire
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341 (2008); Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952 (2012).
76
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL BRIBERY & CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012), (LexisNexis
2012).
77
See Note, supra note 6 at 1249–50.
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Despite these challenges, many states have adopted criminal
provisions prohibiting commercial bribery. 78 These state regulations
vary, however. Some states punish commercial bribery as a felony,
others as a misdemeanor. 79 Some states define commercial bribery
broadly; others define it as applying only to certain activities.80 Further,
the elements of the offense vary a great deal from state to state, including
varying “degrees of culpability, levels of intent, relationships among the
parties, and showings of harm, among others.” 81
In addition to the challenge presented by the lack of uniformity
among state anti-corruption statues, several major problems arise when
applying state criminal laws to international trade. First, many statutes
apply only to acts of bribery committed within the state’s territory or by
the state’s residents. 82 This makes it impossible to apply those laws to
commercial bribery abroad, even when it is a U.S. company that has
committed the bribery. 83 Second, state statutes do not establish a private
right of action, 84 leaving victims of bribery (both consumers and
competitors) without any redress for the harm suffered. Finally, because
of the difficulty of proving commercial bribery, local prosecutors rarely
enforce such laws. 85
Another problem with punishing international corruption under state
anti-corruption statues is that some states punish corruption under tort
schemes with ineffective deterrents (e.g. unfair competition and tortious
interference with business relationships). As Judge Richard Posner said,
“[B]ribery is a deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make it
worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain.” 86 Such tort
cases can be difficult to pursue because courts are reluctant to let such
cases stand. 87
78

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING CHAPTER 33:1 INTRODUCTION (2014).
Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic Commercial Bribery laws,
2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 163 (2012).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY & CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012), (LexisNexis 2012).
83
For example, in U.S. v. Welch, a famous case about Salt Lake City officials bribing the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the district court held that the Utah commercial bribery
statute did not apply to the members of the IOC and dismissed the charges. 248 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.
Utah 2001). The case was reversed and remanded by U.S. v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003).
Yet, Welch was not prosecuted for giving over $1 million in gifts and payouts to the members of the
IOC. Additionally, at least some episodes of bribing happened in Utah or within the U.S., which
made the reversal and application of U.S. laws possible. It is an open question, however, whether
state laws, even with the help of the Travel Act, can be applied to events that occurred completely
outside the United States, like when an American corporation’s agent gives a bribe to secure a
contract in another country.
84
Editorial Staff, COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING, Ch. 33 § 1, at Introduction
(2014).
85
Id. This position is understandable: in the world of limited resources, public agencies will
always have to choose what law enforcement priorities to pursue. The potential effects of
commercial bribery pale in comparison to the devastating effects of murder, human and drug
trafficking, and other “traditional” crimes. Additionally, criminal law imposes a very high standard
of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—on the prosecution.
86
Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004).
87
For example, in New York, the burden of proof in such cases rests on the victim, and the
amount of damages is generally limited to the bribe amount. See John P. Woods, Civil Forfeiture as
79
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This reluctance seems reasonable for several reasons. First, the line
between bona fide promotional business expenditures and bribes lacks
clarity. Additionally, there is always the risk of discouraging legal
business practices and encouraging competitors’ rent-seeking behavior
by setting easy-to-establish prima facie case elements. However, the
amount of the bribe (and sometimes the revenue the bribe generates)
usually limits the award of damages in commercial bribery cases. 88
Ultimately, though, state tort corruption actions and criminal corruption
laws will likely fail in foreign commercial bribery cases because the
Constitution prohibits the states from dealing with international trade
issues. 89
2. Federal Statutes Relating to Commercial Bribery
One recent study that explores the attitudes of Americans towards
bribery shows that Americans disapprove of commercial bribery almost
as much as they do government bribery, especially among corporate
executive and high-ranking public officials. 90 Such attitudes are not new;
in 1922, concern of widespread commercial bribery prompted the House
of Representatives to declare a need for additional deterrence in the form
of uniform federal legislation. 91 Although the 1992 House introduced and
even passed such legislation, the Senate did not agree, so it never became
law. 92
Still, several federal statutes currently allow for the prosecution of
bribery. The Robinson-Patman Act regulates discriminatory pricing and
so-called “dummy commissions.” 93 The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
and the doctrine of “honest services” give companies a right of action
against employees who act contrary to the interests of the company by
accepting or giving bribes. 94 And the Travel Act makes it a criminal

a Remedy for Corruption in Public and Private Contracting in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 931, 961
(2011). Woods argues that this encourages private sector corruption and that imposing forfeiture and
reimbursement remedy in this context would change the situation significantly. Id.
88
See Williams Elec. Games, Inc., 366 F.3d at 576 (“The victim of commercial bribery, who
usually as here is the principal of an agent who was bribed, can obtain by way of remedy either the
damages that he has sustained (the damages remedy) or the profits that the bribe yielded (the
restitution or unjust enrichment remedy). The total profits would consist of the bribe itself (received
by Barry, of course, not by Garrity or Arrow), plus the revenue that the bribe generated for the
briber, minus the cost of goods sold and any other variable costs incurred in making the sales that
generated that revenue.” (citation omitted)).
89
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90
See Stuart P. Green & Mathew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime
Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 47, table 2 (2012).
Authors assert that though corrupt government officials are still perceived as more blameworthy and
deserving higher punishment, almost eighty percent of respondents think that corrupt conduct of
corporate board members should be treated as a crime. Id. at 46. Authors claimed that this finding
was “striking” given that federal laws do not regulate commercial bribery, at least not within the
FCPA. Id.
91
Bribery, supra note 6, at 1250.
92
Id.
93
15 U.S.C. § 13 (2014) [hereinafter “Robinson-Patman Act”].
94
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2014).
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offense to violate state commercial bribery regulations while traveling
between states. 95
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. 96 The thrust of
the statute prohibits sellers from charging disparate prices for different
customers. This Act also prohibits sellers from making payments to a
purchaser’s agents or brokers with the purpose of inducing the purchaser
to enter into a transaction.97 Many courts recognize this Act as applying
to commercial bribery. 98 In these jurisdictions, the illegal payment itself
qualifies as a violation. 99
Notably, the Robinson-Patman Act can also be applied to
commercial bribery involving foreign transactions. 100 However, the
language of the statute is not focused on international bribery, and courts
have narrowly interpreted the language of the statute by limiting the
meaning of “within the flow” of commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations under 15 U.S.C. § 13(c). 101 Courts have yet to rule
that the Robinson-Patman Act applies to private sector commercial
bribery in foreign trade. 102
95

18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 13.
97
15 U.S.C. § 13(c) reads, in the relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the
direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such
compensation is so granted or paid.”
98
See, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169–70 n.6 (1960) (mentioning that the
Act might apply to commercial bribery); Bridges v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 201 F.3d 6 (1st
Cir. 2000) (discussing, without deciding, that commercial bribery is actionable under § 2(c)).
99
Editorial Staff, COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING, Ch. 33 § 1, at Introduction
(2014).
100
In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued identical consent orders against the
Lockheed Corporation and the Boeing Company for making payments to foreign government
officials in connection with the sales of aircrafts. See In re Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978); In
re Boeing Co., 92 F.T.C. 972 (1978). The FTC concluded that such payments had an effect on other
domestic competitors by depriving them of sales opportunities with bribed governments and
officials.
101
In Rotec Industries v. Mitsubishi Corp., the court found that payments made by a Japanese
company to a Chinese company to secure a contract for equipment in China were outside of the
Robinson-Patman Act’s reach, even though a U.S. company suffered damages as a result. Rotec
Industries v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003).
102
Although not on an issue of commercial bribery, a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars litigation in the U.S.
of antitrust claims “‘unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations,’ and also, in either case, unless the ‘effect gives rise to a
claim’ under federal antitrust law.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842,
844 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated by 12704 U.S. App LEXIS, July 1, 2014. (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161–62 (2004); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d
845, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 23 (2013), opinion and judgment
vacated by the order on July 1, 2014, rehearing granted. Judge Posner, who wrote the opinion,
concluded that unless price fixing of foreign suppliers to Motorola foreign subsidiaries had a
“‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on commerce within the United States,” and
alleged violations occurred not on U.S. soil, an antitrust claim brought in a U.S. court should be
dismissed because of the policy against extra-territorial application of U.S. laws. See id.
“[R]ampant extra-territorial application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a
96
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In addition to the Robinson-Patman Act, the Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes 103 play an important role in fighting domestic corruption, both
private and public. These Statutes prohibit the use of the mail or
interstate wires to execute any “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.” 104 Historically, these Statutes helped to
hold individuals accountable both for monetary losses and for the losses
based on the “honest services” doctrine.105 However, the statute did not
apply to international corruption, and became even less effective with the
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United States when the Court
held that the Wire Fraud Statute applies only to the protection of property
rights, and “does not extend to the intangible right of the citizenry to
good government.” 106 Although this case concerned public sector
corruption, it affected the prosecution of cases involving commercial
bribery as well. 107
After McNally, Congress reacted swiftly by promulgating Section
1346, which provided the new statutory basis for the “intangible right to
honest services” fraud. 108 Yet again, in 2010, the Supreme Court in
Skilling v. United States limited the interpretation of the Statutes only to
schemes involving bribery and kickbacks, 109 leaving undisclosed selfdealing by public officials and private employees completely out of the
Statutes’ reach. 110 For now, the fate of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes’
effort to create a right to honest services, with the implied right of action

foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.’” Id. at 8 (citing F.
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 161–62). Allowing the Sherman Act to have extra-territorial
reach would create “friction with many foreign countries and ‘resent[ment at] the apparent effort of
the United States to act as the world’s competition police officer,’ a primary concern motivating the
foreign trade act.” Id. at 8 (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942,
960–62 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (dissenting opinion), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem,
Inc. 683 F.3d 845, 853–54). Extending this logic to the Robinson-Patman Act would lead to a
similar—and paradoxical—conclusion in the context of private sector corruption in foreign trade: it
is akin to allowing one’s child to destroy a neighbor’s yard and not punishing him or her for it
because of some illusory considerations of comity and potential frictions justified by lack of effect on
one’s own yard.
103
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012).
104
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
105
J.B. Perrine & Patricia M. Kipnis, Navigating the Honest Services Fraud Statute After
Skilling v. United States, 72 ALA. L. REV. 294, 295–96 (2011).
106
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
107
For example, in United States v. Covino, the Second Circuit ruled that an employee who
directed business opportunities to a contractor in exchange for money and property did not breach
the duty of loyalty to his company because there was no evidence that his employer overpaid for the
contractor’s services or suffered any property loss beyond the intangible, non-property interest in the
honest and faithful services of an employee. United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 70 (1988).
108
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
109
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). Jeffrey Skilling was the Enron CEO who
was charged with self-dealing under the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes and the related doctrine of
“honest services.” The majority of the Supreme Court justices rejected the arguments that the law
covers prosecuting for “self-dealing”—that is, taking some action that gives one personal gain,
without disclosing that fact. The Justices reasoned that expanding the interpretation of the statute to
cover anything more than bribes and kickbacks would be unconstitutional because the plain
language of the statute does not give people clear understanding of what is forbidden.
110
Hon. Pamela Mathy, Honest Services After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 701 (2011).
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when that right is violated, remains unclear.111 The Statutes might yet be
effectively used in bribery and kickback foreign trade cases, but they no
longer cover other forms of private sector corruption and they do not
give employers and citizens the right to sue for breach of loyalty and
fiduciary duties.
Finally, the Travel Act applies to any person participating “in
interstate or foreign commerce,” or who uses “mail or any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce” with the intent to commit enumerated
criminal acts, including the violation of state or U.S. bribery laws. 112
Initially, some disagreement existed over whether the generic term
“bribery” applied to commercial bribery, however the Supreme Court
settled the dispute in Perrin v. United States. 113 In Perrin, the Court held
that violating state commercial bribery statutes could indicate a Travel
Act violation. 114 Since Perrin, however, only a few reported cases have
applied the Travel Act to commercial bribery. 115
Though the Travel Act applies to international trade, 116 it can be
difficult to prove that commercial transactions happening outside a U.S.
territory violate any U.S. federal or state laws. The Travel Act does not
state that the predicate violation can be based on a law of a foreign
country, 117 and no other federal law directly criminalizes commercial
bribery. As with state commercial bribery statutes, the Travel Act does
not provide a private right of action to victims of private sector
corruption. 118 This leaves enforcement susceptible to the pressures of
international policy and resource scarcity, further limiting the Travel
Act’s influence on international trade.
C. The Need for Reform
U.S. regulations of private sector corruption currently resemble a
patchwork quilt. Many states have criminal laws prohibiting commercial
bribery; however, such laws are inconsistent from state to state, and the
scope of their application to international transactions is not clear. State
tort law is equally variable. Current state approaches to damages likely
discourage victims from starting expensive litigation.119 In the absence of
a federal statute prohibiting commercial bribery, the efforts of private
plaintiffs to recover under the doctrine of honest services or under the
111

See Perrine, supra note 105, at 297–98.
Pub. L. No 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act).
Specifically, § 1952(b)(2) states that bribery in violation of the laws of the State in which committed
or of the United States is an “unlawful activity” within the meaning of the statute.
113
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
114
Id. at 45.
115
Rohlfsen, supra note 79, at 151.
116
Welch, 327 F.3d at 1081. See supra note 83.
117
18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2) specifically covers “bribery . . . in violation of the State in which
committed or of the United States.” It is doubtful that the word “State” in its ordinary sense
encompassed foreign countries. The Supreme Court or any other federal courts have not addressed
this issue yet.
118
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
119
See supra notes 86-89 and related text.
112
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Robinson-Patman Act could prove unsuccessful in international trade
cases. The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes’ effectiveness in deterring
private sector corruption remains unclear and could remain quite limited.
Further, though the Travel Act criminalizes bribery committed in
violation of state laws, it does not give a private right of action and it
requires significant governmental resources to put together a viable
international trade case. Finally, although the FCPA has the requisite
extra-territorial reach, it simply does not cover private sector corruption.
Nevertheless, corruption consistently remains one of the top
concerns of the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigations “because
of the extent and seriousness of their existence to a free democratic
society.” 120 Another DOJ goal remains to promote international efforts in
fighting corruption. 121 Despite these concerns, U.S. national anticorruption legislation falls significantly behind that of other nations—
including China and Russia 122 —in terms of prohibiting private sector
corruption, leading to questions as to whether the United States will
retain its status as a global leader in the fight against corruption.
The U.S. should take action now to consider what options provide it
with the ability to regulate private corruption in international trade. The
current legislative void needs to be filled either by amending the FCPA
to cover private sector corruption abroad, or by enacting a separate
federal statute. 123 The FCPA just celebrated its thirty-fifth anniversary
and, despite the criticism, has proven to be an efficient, if limited,
instrument in deterring and prosecuting bribery of foreign public
officials. The FCPA has helped change business culture: companies now
almost universally adopt business conduct codes and provide trainings to
employees on various ethics topics. 124 Therefore, the best option is to
amend the FCPA.
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION
PROBLEM
To give an overview of the global efforts in fighting private sector
corruption, this Section will explore the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC); the Organization for Economic
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related
instruments; The Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Conventions on

120
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STEWARDS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM:
STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2007–2012, at 6 (2007); see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2012–2016, at 11 (2012).
121
Strategic Plan FY 2012-2016, supra note 120, at 11.
122
See Part III.D.
123
Which in fact means amending the Securities Exchange Act for accounting and reporting
provisions and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 for inclusion of private sector bribery as a punishable criminal
offense.
124
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S.
BUSINESS 17 (Mar. 4, 1981), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf.
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Corruption; and some recent national legislative initiatives in countries
such as the United Kingdom, China, and Russia.
With many countries adopting private sector corruption regulations,
U.S. companies abroad may find themselves under much stricter scrutiny
in light of local laws. Thus, compliance with the FCPA fails to shield a
corporation from undesirable investigations and lawsuits in foreign
jurisdictions.
A. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The UNCAC provides a global and legally binding instrument for
fighting corruption at the international level.125 The Convention aims at
preventing and combating various forms of corruption through
encouraging international cooperation and technical assistance; providing
mechanisms of asset recovery; and promoting integrity, accountability,
and proper management of public affairs and property. 126
Corruption has concerned the United Nations (UN) for several
decades. 127 The idea of creating an international legal instrument against
corruption grew out of the preparatory work for the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime. 128 In December 2000, the UN
General Assembly tasked the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with negotiating the
new anti-corruption convention. 129 In January 2002, the UN General
Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should draft and negotiate
a comprehensive anti-corruption convention. 130 The General Assembly
adopted the UNCAC on October 31, 2003, and opened it for signatures
by Member States in December 2003. 131 The convention then entered
into force on December 14, 2005. 132 As of October 19, 2012, UNCAC
was signed by 140 countries, and listed 165 countries as “State

125
Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on
International Companies, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 481, 481 (2007). [hereinafter, Argandoña 2007].
126
U.N. Convention against Corruption art. 1, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/422, 3249
U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter UNCAC].
127
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
THE ELABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (2010), available
at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Travaux/Travaux_Preparatoires__UNCAC_E.pdf. Argandoña cites as examples: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS (1979), MANUAL OF PRACTICAL MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION (1990), BASIC
PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (1990), INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS (1996), and DECLARATION ON CRIME AND PUBLIC SAFETY (1996). Argandoña 2007,
supra note 125, at 493 n.4.
128
Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 485.
129
G.A. Res. 55/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/61 (Dec. 4, 2000).
130
G.A. Res. 56/260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/260 (Jan. 31, 2002).
131
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 127, xlii.
132
Id. at xliii.
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parties.” 133 The United States ratified the convention on October 30,
2006. 134
The UNCAC does not give a clear definition of corruption. Instead,
it focuses on identifying the most common forms of corruption, such as
bribery, money laundering, embezzlement and misappropriation of
property by public officials, trading in influence, abuse of positions, and
others. 135 The UNCAC, however, does provide room for the adopting
countries to choose a set of measures they want to implement. 136
Although some anti-corruption provisions are mandatory for adoption by
the state-parties, other provisions—including provisions on private sector
corruption—are only recommended measures. 137
Provisions on private sector corruption represent one of the
UNCAC’s most significant and controversial innovations. 138 The
UNCAC addresses both preventive measures, such as enhancing
accounting and auditing standards, promoting transparency of the private
sector, directly prohibiting certain practices, and potentially
criminalizing bribery and embezzlement in the private sector. 139
Interestingly, the United States (the country that has long led the global
fight against public sector corruption) actively opposed regulation of
purely private sector conduct. 140 As a result of the United States’
opposition, the final version of the UNCAC includes only nonmandatory measures for private sector corruption criminalization.141 By
2011, fewer than half of the State parties had criminalized bribery in the
private sector, but many countries had adopted criminal provisions
against embezzlement. 142
Another significant innovation of the UNCAC is the creation of a
private right of action for the entities or persons who have suffered
damage resulting from corrupt acts. 143 The provision was adopted despite
the protests of U.S. companies that feared increasing exposure to

133

U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, UNCAC SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION STATUS AS
SEPTEMBER
24,
2012,
(Feb.
12,
2013,
10:50
AM),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
134
Id.
135
UNCAC, supra note 126, art. 14 (money laundering), art.15 (bribery of domestic officials),
art. 16 (bribery of foreign officials), art. 21 (private sector bribery), art. 14 (money laundering), art.
17 (embezzlement), art. 18 (trading in influence), and art. 19 (abuse of functions).
136
Argandoña 2007, supra note125, at 485–88.
137
Id. at 488–89.
138
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TECHNICAL GUIDE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION
AGAINST
CORRUPTION
56
(2009),
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/TechnicalGuide/0984395_Ebook.pdf; see also Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption:
Global Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 191, 213 (2005).
139
UNCAC, supra note 126, arts. 12, 21.
140
Webb, supra note 138, at 213. Webb reports that the U.S. representative said that the
country deals with this problem “in another way.”
141
See id. at 214 (2005); Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 494 n.21.
142
Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct.
24–28, 2011, Report on Implementation of Chapter III (Criminalization and Law Enforcement) of
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, ¶¶ 11–12, CAC/COSP/2011/2 (Aug. 25, 2011).
143
UNCAC, supra note 126, art. 35.
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lawsuits brought by foreign parties. 144 Each State party, however, retains
an unabridged right to determine under which circumstances its courts
will be available for such actions.145
The UNCAC reflects the growing international recognition of
corruption and promotes anti-corruption culture. 146 Although the
UNCAC is a product of political compromise and does not provide a
mandatory framework to deal with private sector corruption, its measures
at least attempt to curb corruption.
B. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions
In the early 1990s, the issue of promoting international instruments
that prohibit bribery of public officials became a priority for the United
States government. 147 As a result of joint efforts by the Departments of
State, Commerce, and the Treasury, the issue of international bribery
started to appear on the agendas of many international organizations.148
Corruption and bribery of public officials were first internationally
discussed in 1996 at the meeting of the G-7 heads of state in Lyon,
France. 149 On November 21, 1997, the OECD Council of Ministers
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions. 150 The Convention
entered into force on February 15, 1999. 151 Initially not very popular, the
Convention gained momentum in the 2000s, and is currently ratified by
thirty-nine countries. 152 These countries represent two-thirds of all
international trade and three-quarters of all international investment. 153
The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions keeps track of the implementation of the Convention and
related instruments in the State parties.
The Convention requires all member parties to criminalize bribery of
foreign public officials—both active and passive forms—and eliminates
144

See Webb, supra note 138, at 214.
U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention
Against Corruption on the Work of its First to Seventh Sessions, Addendum: Interpretative Notes for
the Official Records (travaux preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention
against
Corruption,
add.,
A/58/422/Add.1,
(Oct.
7,
2003),
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/session_7/422add1.pdf.
146
See Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 482, 485; Webb, supra note 138, at 215.
147
Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 593, 610 (2001).
148
Id. at 611 (mentioning that the OECD started to issue anti-bribery recommendations in 1994
and citing to Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions,
OECD Doc. No. C(94)75/Final (27 May 1994), 33ILM 1389 (1994)).
149
OFOSU-AMAAH, supra note 5, at 74.
150
Id.
151
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, Dec. 17, 1997, (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:39 AM),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/oecdantibriberyconventionentryintoforceoftheconvention.htm.
152
Id.
153
Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, An Overview: Much
Done, But a Lot More to Do . . . , 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 306–7 (2012).
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the tax deductibility of such bribes, but it does not cover private sector
corruption. 154 This does not mean, however, that OECD members turn a
blind eye to this problem. The 2011 Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises contain a general prohibition of bribery by companies,
including offering bribes to employees of business partners. 155 The
Guidelines go beyond the scope of the FCPA, suggesting that companies
should discourage even small, facilitating payments. 156
The OECD Convention is indicative of the growing attention of the
international community to the problem of private sector corruption.
Though not recognized in the Convention itself, private sector corruption
is condemned in the guidelines and in other instruments issued in
furtherance of the Convention.
C. The Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Conventions on
Corruption
Around the same time the OECD started working on its anti-bribery
convention, the Council of Europe started developing its own legal
instruments to fight corruption. 157 A Multidisciplinary Group on
Corruption was tasked with developing a comprehensive strategy of
fighting corruption, which was endorsed in 1996. 158 After extensive
consultations, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was opened
for signatures on January 27, 1999, 159 and was adopted on November 4,
1999. 160
In May 1998, the Committee of Ministers, during the 102nd Session
in Strasbourg, authorized the establishment of the Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO). 161 Established on May 1, 1999 GRECO

154
See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(entered
into
force
on
Feb.
15
1999),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
155
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES
MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
47
(ed.
2011),
FOR
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pd
f (“In particular, enterprises should: Not offer, promise or give undue pecuniary or other advantage
to public officials or the employees of business partners.”).
156
Id. at 47–48.
157
Ofosu-Amaah, supra note 149, at 75 (1999). At the 19th Conference of the Council of
Europe in Valetta, Malta in 1994, European officials called upon the member-countries to respond to
the threat of corruption, which undermined democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Id.
158
Id. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
(Feb.
13,
2013,
11:45
AM),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/2.%20Historical%20Background_en.asp.
159
Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, ETS No. 173
(1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm [hereinafter
Criminal Law Convention].
160
Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, ETS No. 174
(1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/174.htm [hereinafter Civil
Law Convention].
161
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 158.
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currently includes fifty countries, including the U.S. 162 In addition to
OECD and GRECO, on July 22, 2003, the Council of the European
Union adopted Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA f, which aims at
ensuring that corruption in the private sector is criminalized in all
member states, requiring effective, proportionate and dissuasive
penalties, including criminal liability of legal entities.163
Both the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption
recognize “passive” (i.e. bribe-taking) and “active” (bribe-giving,
solicitation) corruption. Articles 7 and 8 of the Criminal Convention on
Corruption provide for mandatory criminalization of both active and
passive bribery in the private sector. 164 The Convention also calls for
criminal liability for violations of accounting regulations intentionally
made to disguise corrupt acts. 165
The Civil Convention on Corruption requires that all signatories
establish effective remedies for people who have been harmed by
corruption. 166 Notably, the Convention establishes an affirmative defense
of contributory negligence. 167 If any part of a contract calls for corrupt
acts, such a part should be declared null and void. 168 However, a contract
obtained by corrupt means is merely voidable.169
D. Country Case Studies: United Kingdom, China, and Russia
Corruption in the private sector has been addressed not only at the
international level, but also at the national level. Besides joining various
international anti-corruption treaties, some countries are amending their
domestic legislation to address the corruption problem. This Section will
highlight three recent and notable examples of such amendments: the
United Kingdom, Russia, and China. Recent legislative developments in
these countries indicate a shift in attitudes toward corruption of the big
players on the international trade scene. When compared to these
changes, the FCPA seems unhelpful in providing guidance to U.S.
companies because some of its provisions—like facilitating payments—
would be illegal in other countries.

162

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION: MEMBERS AND
OBSERVERS
(Feb.
14,
2013,
1:48
PM),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/members_en.asp.
163
2003 O.J. (L. 192) (European Union Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of July
22, 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003F0568:EN:NOT.
164
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 159, arts. 7–8.
165
Id. at art. 14.
166
Civil Law Convention, supra note 160, art. 1, April 11, 1999, art. 4 (outlining the prima
facie case elements: (i) the defendant has committed or authorized the act of corruption, or failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent the act of corruption; (ii) the plaintiff has suffered damage; and (iii)
there is a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage).
167
Id. at art. 6.
168
Id. at art. 8.
169
Id.
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1. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010
In 2010, the U.K. adopted the Bribery Act, but it did not go into
force until July 2012. 170 The Act covers bribe-giving, solicitation of
bribes, and acceptance of bribes. 171 The Act’s influence is so broad, in
fact, that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recognizes the Act as having
the potential, under some circumstances, to influence U.S. companies. 172
One of the major innovations of the Act is that it criminalizes bribery in
the private sector along with bribery of public officials. 173
The U.K. Bribery Act differs from the FCPA in its treatment of
“grease” payments: the Act prohibits such payments, but gives
companies an affirmative defense of having “adequate procedures”
designed to deter bribery. 174 The U.K. has issued guidelines on what are
deemed “adequate procedures,” but plenty of ambiguity remains. 175
Such an approach is likely to encourage companies to invest in
corruption prevention strategies and programs. On the other hand, the
ambiguity of the Act might lead to economically inefficient levels of
investment in such initiatives, creating “paper shields” instead of
effective mechanisms for prevention and detection of corrupt practices.
Another potential consequence is withdrawal from regions where
corruption is common, similar to what scholars labeled as “unintended
consequences” of the FCPA. 176 Some scholars also raise concerns that
corrupt businesspersons and officials will just invest more into hiding
their criminal dealings, deflecting valuable resources from other
productive activities.177
2. Countries with Endemic Corruption: China and Russia
Russia and China have both been characterized as countries with
corruption so pervasive that it could potentially paralyze foreign
investment projects or simply render such projects economically
unprofitable. 178 Both countries, in attempts to secure foreign investment
170
Bribery
Act,
2010,
c.
23
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents [hereinafter U.K. Bribery Act].
171
Id.
172
Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the
Foreign
Corrupt
Practices
Act,
11-14,
(2010),
available
at
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
173
U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 168, § 3(2). The section lists that to be actionable, the bribery
should relate to “(a) any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected with a business, (c)
any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, (d) any activity performed by or on
behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporate).”
174
Id. § 7(2).
175
Robinson, supra note 153, at 319.
176
Spalding, supra note 63 at 358.
177
See, e.g., Eric Engle, I Get By with a Little Help from my Friends? Understanding the U.K.
Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1187 (2010) (highlighting certain anti-corruption statutes, however, criticism is
applicable to any anti-bribery statute).
178
See WILLIAM L. MILLER, ÅSE B. GRØDELAND, & TATYANA Y. KOSHECHKINA, A CULTURE
OF CORRUPTION?: COPING WITH GOVERNMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2001).
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and fulfill their international commitments, recently adopted significant
changes to their anti-corruption regulations.179 Russia signed and ratified
the UNCAC in 2006, 180 and on January 10, 2009, Russia’s new anticorruption legislation came into effect. 181 After that, Russia applied for
accession to the OECD Convention and became a full member of
GRECO. 182 As a consequence, new federal statutes that criminalize
corruption in both the public and the private sectors went into effect.183
The statutes provide for administrative liability for corrupt acts
committed “on behalf or in the interests” of a company. 184 Though there
is no criminal liability for corporations,185 individuals can be sentenced
for up to twelve years in prison and fined up to 100 times the bribe
amount, not to exceed $500 million RUR (approximately $17 million
USD). 186 In addition, Russian anti-corruption laws have the same extraterritorial reach as the FCPA and the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act. 187
Moreover, Russia recognizes neither the U.K. “compliance” defense nor
the U.S. “facilitating payments” exception, which makes Russia’s
statutory framework one of the most demanding in the world. 188 Because
of this, American companies relying on the FCPA for guidance on doing
business in Russia are no longer insulated from prosecution for
“ministerial” payments and should take steps to bring their compliance
programs up to speed with Russian regulations.
Chinese anti-corruption legislation has undergone significant
changes as well. China joined the UNCAC in 2006. 189 In May 2011,
China’s new anti-corruption legislation criminalizing both active and
passive corruption took effect. 190 191 This legislation is significant since
private sector corruption and bribing public officials (both domestic and

179

See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2011, 12–13 (2011).
U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, U. N. CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 5 SEPTEMBER 2014 (Sep. 26, 2014, 3:25 PM),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
181
UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 201-04 (Russ.)
(abuse of position in private enterprises), art. 285-93 (abuse of position in public service);
Federal’nyi Zakon RF O Protivodeystvii Korruptsii [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on AntiCorruption Measures], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Dec. 30 2008 (available at
http://www.russian-criminal-code.com).
182
Robinson, supra note 151, at 317.
183
UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] (Russ.) art. 201-04
(abuse of position in private enterprises), art. 285-93 (abuse of position in public service).
184
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP
RF] [Code of Administrative Violations] art. 19.28.
185
Corporate criminal liability simply does not exist under Russian law (author’s note).
186
Robinson, supra note 153, at 316.
187
Id.
188
See id.
189
U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 178.
190
Amanda Turnill, et al., What to Do when You Suspect Corruption: Disclosure Obligations
and Enforcement Processes in the UK, the US, Australia and China, PRACTICAL LAW (Oct. 11,
2014, 10:10PM), www.practicallaw.com/2-520-1484.
191
See Xíng fǎ (刑法) [Criminal Code] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) ch. III, § 1, arts. 163, 164, ch. VIII, arts. 385, 386, 389
(China), translated in Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 15, 2013) available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php.
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foreign) are equally recognized under the law. 192 As with Russian laws,
Chinese laws do not have criminal liability for corporations (though such
corporations can be fined) 193 and corporate officials directly involved or
responsible for the illegal conduct can be imprisoned. 194 For large-scale
commercial bribery, a person can be punished by a minimum sentence of
five years and have his or her property confiscated. 195 Chinese law,
however, provides mitigated sentences for voluntary reporting and
cooperation during investigation. 196
China and Russia, with the combined population of over 1.5 billion
people, 197 represent a big market for U.S. companies. Thus, changes in
their anti-corruption regulations inevitably affect any U.S. corporations
doing business in these countries. This new generation of anti-corruption
statutes, modeled after the UNCAC, has the same extra-territorial reach
as the FCPA, but covers other forms of corrupt conduct outside of
bribery, including corruption in the private sector. 198 Thus, corporate
managers should not lightly dismiss new anti-corruption initiatives in
developing markets; prosecution always remains a possibility, even if the
current number of cases is small. 199
To illustrate the magnitude of the risk of prosecution, in 2012 alone,
more than 7,000 people were sentenced by Russian courts for various
corruption offenses. 200 Notably, there are already some examples of
private sector corruption cases. For instance, an IKEA Russia employee
has recently been tried and convicted for aiding and abetting in soliciting
a bribe of 6.5 million rubles to renew a lease contract with an IKEA
lessee. 201 Similarly, anti-corruption initiatives in other countries might
pick up pace with the development of international cooperation
instruments.
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Id. ch. III, § 1, arts. 163, 164, ch. VIII, arts. 385, 386, 389.
Id. ch. VIII, art. 393.
194
Id. ch. VIII, arts. 386, 383 (providing punishment for up to five years in prison if the
circumstances are serious and the amount of the bribe is relatively large; domestic public officials
accepting large bribes can be sentenced from ten years to a lifetime in prison, or even death penalty,
with confiscation of all their property).
195
Id. ch. III, art.163.
196
Id. ch. III, art.163, ch. VIII, art. 390.
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According to the Population Reference Bureau, the population of China in 2014 is 1,364
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people.
2014 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau,
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198
See supra notes 189-196 and the related text.
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РБК
(Feb.
14,
2013,
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PM),
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/14/01/2013/840081.shtml (in Russian).
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Samuel Rubenfeld, Russia Accuses IKEA Manager of Extorting a Bribe, WALL ST. J.
CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (December 19, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2011/12/19/russia-accuses-ikea-manager-of-extorting-a-bribe/; See Andrew E. Kramer, Ikea
Tries to Build Public Case Against Russian Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/business/global/12ikea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. This case
is especially interesting because IKEA was famous for taking an uncompromising stand against
corruption in Russia and even stopped all new business projects in Russia when faced with
unprecedented levels of corruption among government employees.
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

This Section proposes three approaches the U.S. Congress can take
to tackle the problem of private sector corruption: (1) adopt an FCPAlike statute criminalizing private sector corruption or amend the FCPA;
(2) leave legislation in its current state and rely on the courts to solve
arising problems; or (3) adopt a hybrid solution: extend the FCPA’s
accounting/reporting provisions and give a private right of action to
victims of corruption. While each solution has its benefits and
drawbacks, it might be premature and inefficient to criminalize private
sector corruption altogether. On the other hand, it is also clear that some
steps have to be taken to give the market clear signals that unethical
business practices will no longer be tolerated, be it in the United States or
abroad. If everything is left as it is now, corporations will still be tempted
to act corruptly in private dealings because there is no punishment and no
way for competitors or victims to recover damages through litigation.
This Section advocates the hybrid solution—incorporating both a private
right of action and heightened reporting requirements—because the idea
of criminalizing private sector corruption has no widespread support yet,
but the problem is big enough to turn society’s attention to it.
A. Adoption of an FCPA-like Statute for Private Sector Corruption
The first solution is the most apparent one. Since the U.S. is a State
party to the UNCAC and is also a full member of GRECO, it should
follow the U.N. Convention and adopt a federal statute—or amend the
FCPA—criminalizing private sector corruption. Though criminalization
of private sector corruption is considered to be a non-mandatory
offense, 202 meaning that State parties only need to consider criminalizing
such offenses, some countries have already taken steps in this
direction. 203 This statute would be a good vehicle for such legislative
changes. It already has general books and records provisions complying
with Article 12 of the UNCAC, and the only amendment necessary
would be inclusion of private sector corruption into its anti-bribery
provisions. Most importantly, unlike existing federal statutes, the FCPA
has extra-territorial reach. 204 This solution would be in line with some
leaders’ congressional intent when adopting the FCPA.205
This solution, however, has quite a few potential drawbacks. First,
criminalizing private sector corruption would likely be highly unpopular

202

U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, DIVISION FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 95 (2nd
rev. ed., 2012), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf.
203
See Part III.D. (stating that the U.K., China, Russia, and many other countries adopted
comprehensive legislation dealing with private and public corruption alike).
204
See Part II.B.2.
205
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 at 19 (stating that simply adding accounting provisions would not
deter bribery, but that criminal sanctions would).
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with corporations. 206 In 2010, the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Research published a paper on FCPA reform, 207 which urges the
government to ease the FCPA’s grip on companies by adding a
“compliance defense” and by defining “foreign officials” more
narrowly. 208 In response to these and other concerns, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) released its Resource Guide to the FCPA on
November 14, 2012. 209 The guide affirms previous positions taken by the
government: though compliance is not a defense, it is a relevant factor to
consider in deciding penalties, 210 and “foreign officials” still includes
employees of “state-controlled or state-owned” enterprises. 211 There is
no reason to think that the government would digress from these views if
it were to decide to criminalize corruption in the private sector through
the FCPA. It is very likely that there would be similar push-back from
the business community.
Sweetening the pill by allowing the compliance defense, similar to
the U.K. Bribery Act, might be a logical step should the FCPA be
amended to cover private sector bribery cases. First, employees
sometimes act corruptly despite existence of business conduct codes and
extensive training programs simply because the value of personal gains
for them is higher than the chances of being prosecuted. 212 For example,
in a recent case, a Morgan Stanley employee responsible for the
company’s real estate business in China pled guilty to bribing Chinese
public officials. 213 The employee received seven trainings on the FCPA
from Morgan Stanley in addition to at least thirty-five reminders to
comply with the statute. 214 “Morgan Stanley’s compliance personnel
regularly monitored transactions, randomly audited particular employees,
transactions, and business units, and tested to identify illicit
payments.” 215 In the Morgan Stanley case, existence of extensive anticorruption policies, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms within a
corporation was not enough to deter the employee from engaging in
corrupt practices. So far, it remains the only case where the DOJ decided
to not prosecute the company and to charge only the employee. 216
206
The FCPA has been criticized as being a competitive disadvantage to U.S. companies doing
business abroad. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
207
U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL RESEARCH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
208
Id. at 11–14, 24–27 (respectively).
209
CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCEMENT DIV., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter THE FCPA GUIDE].
210
Id. at 54.
211
Id. at 20.
212
See Id. at 61.
213
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty
for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Extensive compliance efforts are one of the factors the DOJ considers when deciding
whether to prosecute a case or not. See THE FCPA GUIDE, supra note 209.
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Second, legislators should consider that many people still think that
corruption in the private sector is a less serious offense than in the public
sector because there is no direct loss of taxpayer monies and because the
harm to society is less apparent. 217 The effects of corruption and fraud on
the corporate level, however, may be quite tangible. Sometimes
employees commit corrupt acts to advance the goals of their
organization, and sometimes they act corruptly just for personal gains. 218
Both types of corrupt conduct result in the company “spinning its
wheels” to regain the lost money while its competitors fully reinvest their
profits—or pay larger dividends to their shareholders—and generate
more income. 219
Finally, introducing a compliance defense for private sector
corruption offenses would incentivize corporations to invest in effective
compliance programs. Providing such incentives would thus increase
compliance with the statutory requirements. 220 Corruption, even when
committed to promote corporate interests, is not costless. Compliance
and corruption programs can save corporations from costs associated
with corruption, such as defending anti-corruption lawsuits. 221 Providing
a compliance defense gives corporations an extra incentive to invest in
such programs.
Amending the FCPA, or introducing a similar statute criminalizing
private sector corruption, would likely be a step welcomed by many
international organizations. Though it may cause an outcry among
American corporations, “sweetening the pill” by allowing a compliance
defense, at least in private sector corruption cases, may ultimately benefit
American corporations. This is because a compliance defense will likely
increase overall compliance and encourage investment in corresponding
corporate programs. 222

217
See Green, supra note 90, at 47, table 2 (2012). Authors assert that though corrupt
government officials are still perceived as more blameworthy and deserving of higher punishment,
almost 80% of respondents think that corrupt conduct of corporate board members should be treated
as a crime. Id. at 46.
218
Conan C. Albrecht et al., The Debilitating Effects of Fraud in Organizations, in CRIME AND
CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS: WHY IT OCCURS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 164 (Ronald J.
Burke et al. eds., 2010).
219
Id. at 166. Authors give General Motors as an example. General Motors suffered a loss of
$436 million from dealership fraud back in the 1980s. To regain the losses, General Motors would
have to generate $436 billion dollars in additional revenue, assuming that the profit margin at that
time was around 10%.
220
This is one of the reasons advanced by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform for
introduction of compliance defense. See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note
57, at 13.
221
See Palazzolo, supra note 56 for costs of litigation estimates.
222
For an example of a recent case where a company avoided FCPA liability because it
provided its employees with substantial FCPA training, see supra notes 212-216 and related text.
The author thinks it is a sufficient incentive to invest in compliance training.
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B. Leaving Everything “As Is”
Another potential solution is to leave the situation “as is.” The U.S.
already has federal statutes to prosecute private sector corruption,223 and
many corporations already have voluntarily invested in business conduct
training and corruption prevention because they understand the benefits
of compliance programs. 224 One might argue that there is no need to
impose additional sanctions and requirements, especially in such a
nuanced and sensitive area as business relations between private parties.
Unlike government agencies that act within strict limitations of statutorydefined budgets, corporations have more freedom to align compensation
with economic results or employees’ conduct. This freedom may be
enough in itself to lower the level of private sector corruption.
Currently, the DOJ considers the existence and effectiveness of a
compliance program as one of the relevant factors in determining
whether to charge a corporation and in negotiating plea bargains or other
agreements. 225 The DOJ recognizes that effective compliance programs
should be tailored to individual companies’ needs and there is no “one
size fits all” solution. 226 Yet, certain hallmarks are expected, including
formal policies, training, senior management commitment, risk
assessment, disciplinary measures, confidential reporting, and others.227
Many positive examples of collective business actions aimed at
reducing corruption exist. One such example of collective business
actions focusing on the reduction of corruption is pharmaceutical
industry. The medical device and pharmaceutical industries have long
been considered as exemplifying industries with a high intrinsic level of
corruption, 228 especially for industry-sponsored clinical trials of medical
devices. 229 Such corruption occurred because companies sought ways to
maximize shareholder results, and some doctors conducting trials
received unethical incentives to provide more favorable data.230 The need
for unbiased opinions pushed the industry to develop and promote an
223

See Part II.B.
In 1981, the General Accounting Office reported that one of the outcomes of the FCPA was
the introduction of company-level conduct codes. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 6 (Mar. 4, 1981), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf.
225
THE FCPA GUIDE, supra note 209, at 53.
226
Id. at 57.
227
Id. at 57–62.
228
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, The Business Case Against Corruption 2 (2011), available at
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industry-wide code of conduct addressing interactions with healthcare
professionals. 231 The Advanced Medical Technology Association
(“AdvaMed”) has created a code of ethics to govern the interactions with
health care professionals. 232 A voluntary certification process enforces
compliance with the Code. 233 AdvaMed keeps an online list of
companies who follow the Code and pass the certification.234 Almost all
large medical device companies (such as Abbot, Allergan, CareFusion,
and Johnson & Johnson) are on the list. 235 This list may create necessary
peer pressure for smaller companies to opt in and play by the rules. The
AdvaMed Code seems to be an effective attempt at an instrument of
industry self-regulation.
However, relying on self-regulation and existing anti-corruption
instruments might not be the optimal solution. Without external
reinforcement, companies lack the incentive to create the corruption-free
environment expected of them when dealing with business partners in
regions with stricter corruption regulation. 236 Additionally, even for the
many businesses who do have conduct codes that prohibit self-dealing,
commercial bribery, and other practices, rogue employees might not be
deterred from unethical conduct, 237 especially given difficulties in
prosecuting private sector corruption cases involving international
trade. 238 Such voluntary instruments may therefore fail to induce
employee compliance 239 because simply adopting an ethics code fails
without various organizational structures to support it. 240 Absent such
support, employees use various strategies to rationalize their corrupt
conduct, 241 and most of them do not even perceive their actions as being
corrupt. 242
231
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Thus, even though companies have incentives to invest in
compliance programs and internal investigations, and though there are
some successful examples of industry self-regulation efforts, these
incentives do not guarantee compliance and they leave enough room for
misconduct. The lack of sanctions provides a powerful temptation to cut
corners in the name of competition, while enforcement of self-regulation
becomes even more problematic because courts interpret current laws
narrowly. 243
C. Hybrid Solution
Another possible solution to the problem of private sector corruption
in international commerce—and the one this Comment recommends—
stands as middle ground between criminalization and the free-market
approaches. This solution includes reforming the FCPA to include
specific reporting requirements on private corruption and giving the
victims of such corruption a private right of action to recover damages.
The first component of this solution—extending FCPA reporting
requirements to include prohibition of misreporting various forms of
private sector corruption—creates a strong incentive for companies to
create and enforce zero-tolerance corruption policies. This plan includes
a total ban on facilitating payments and suspicious “rebates” and fees. In
fact, most companies that fall under FCPA accounting provisions already
have similar policies in place, 244 making it unlikely to create any
inconveniences or disadvantages for them. This solution follows the
spirit of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank changes. 245 Additionally,
disclosure might help civil society organizations, such as Transparency
International, in independently evaluating corruption prevention
programs and “policing” deviations.
Extending FCPA reporting requirements to include public reporting
creates another benefit: companies will be able to analyze policies in
place at peer companies and share and discuss best practices. This, in
turn, will lead to cheaper ways of creating effective compliance systems.
A combination of new public reporting requirements and the defense
of having an effective corruption prevention system in place (akin to the
U.K. Bribery Act) is also a sensible suggestion. 246 This combination
would give companies both an incentive to invest in such programs and
an assurance that the authorities will consider their efforts in making a
decision to charge the company with corruption.
243
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However, companies are not likely to be enthusiastic about new
public reporting requirements. After all, more reporting means more
expense. Additional reporting does not guarantee that companies will fail
to hide the old corrupt culture. 247 Further, the reporting requirements
under the FCPA cover only “issuers,” not all the companies. 248 Publicly
traded “issuers,” however, are usually leaders in their industries. 249 If the
new public reporting requirements require this class of companies to
report any suspicious payments to private counterparties, it will
inevitably affect their supply chains. Thus, the proposed changes will
affect medium and small companies as well.
The second component of this solution would give a private right of
action to competitors or victims to recover damages. Such a right should
exist independent of the SEC’s ability to penalize companies for
violations of reporting requirements. This component is justified in the
context of purely private nature of conduct in commercial bribery and
private sector corruption cases.
A private right of action is more efficient than criminal prosecution
because criminal prosecution of bribery requires tremendous budget
expenditures. Criminal sanctions, though a strong deterring factor, do not
necessarily strike the optimal balance between efficient allocation of
societal resources and crime prevention. Some scholars advocate for a
private right of action in this area because it will give the competitors an
incentive to “police” the market. 250 Many view a private right of action
as a more efficient way to combat private corruption.251 Private citizens
would have the same rights as government to compel disclosure, but,
unlike in criminal cases, the standard of proof in civil cases will likely be
lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal
cases. 252
Of course, this solution raises the issue of frivolous lawsuits by
competitors. After all, lack of express private right of action has not
stopped competitors and shareholders in bringing lawsuits for bribery of
foreign public officials under other legal theories.253 Yet, some scholars
describe private right of action as a “dramatically effective source of
247
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deterrence and appropriate retribution.” 254 Klaw makes the following
argument in support of private right of action under the FCPA:
Moreover, criminological research shows that likelihood of
detection and subsequent sanction, rather than severity of
sanction is the key determinant to deterrence. Civil suits are thus
a particularly apt deterrent, because competitors are likely to
bring them (making the costs of defending litigation a sanction in
itself) and they require a lower standard of proof than criminal
cases. 255
Thus, the combination of a threat of private lawsuits together with
market incentives to maintain a company’s reputation would indeed be a
powerful tool deterring corruption, even without criminalizing it.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite serious criticism, the introduction of the FCPA made
companies treat issues of corruption and bribery abroad more seriously.
A growing trend in the global community condemns and criminalizes
private sector corruption. The United States does not expressly regulate
private sector corruption at the federal level. A long tradition of
criminalizing commercial bribery exists at the state level, but these
statutes have limited effect on the international trade transactions.
Although competitors can bring lawsuits under different legal theories
against companies that obtain business by means of corruption or
bribery, such attempts have had limited success so far.
This situation calls for definitive steps to be taken to prohibit private
sector corruption, including commercial bribery, at the federal level.
Only comprehensive federal legislative changes will be able to fill the
void in the regulations that previously allowed transnational commercial
bribery to slip through the cracks. The U.S. cannot rely on the efforts of
the U.N. or other countries to enact such legislation and punish U.S.
companies for their own misdeeds abroad.
At the same time, given the political discourse and the attitude of the
business community toward the FCPA, criminalizing private sector
bribery is premature. Leaving everything in its current state, however,
also fails as a rational solution. Overreliance on the efficiency of the free
market has led to many problems in the past and provides no guarantee
that the free market will be able to deal with private corruption
efficiently. After all, corruption, by definition, distorts markets.
Amending the FCPA’s accounting and reporting provisions to include
reporting requirements for the private sector corruption provides the
most sensible solution at the moment. It would promote the exchange of
254
255

Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
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best practices and will allow civil society organizations to “police”
compliance with those provisions. Creating a private right of action for
the victims of corruption will help the investigation and prosecution such
allegations without over-extending public resources.
As the case in Wabtec, if no measures are taken, many companies
will remain tempted to simply buy the loyalty of local officials and
business partners in developing countries rather than competing by
providing better goods and services at better prices. Reform should begin
at home to make corporations more accountable for this trillion-dollar
problem.
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